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Ir\ rfHE SUPREME COURT 
0~~ rf,Hr~ 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE ST:\TE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
JERRY DELOUD LEGGROAN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No.10004. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
The appellant has appealed from his conviction for the 
crime of robbery in violation of 76-51-1, U.C.A. 1953. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was tried upon jury trial in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, and was found 
guilty of the crime of robbery and sentenced to be com-
mitted to the State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the judgment of the trial 
court should be affirmed. 
ST~~ TEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent adopts the statement of facts set out in 
the appellant's brief except to the extent that the record 
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may reveal that they have not been stated in a light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict, and to the extent that they 
may be supplemented in the argument portion of this brief. 
Appellant raises three points on appeal, all of which re-
late to the question of whether or not the trial court should 
have allowed the Preliminary hearing testimony of Robert 
S. Ross, a witness to the robbery, who was unavailable at 
trial, to be read to the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING THE 
TRANSCRIPT OF THE TESTIMONY OF ROBERT S. ROSS, 
GIVEN AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING OF THE APPEL-
LANT'S TRIAL, TO BE RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE IN THE 
ABSENCE OF AN ATTEMPT BY THE PROSECUTION TO 
OBTAIN THE PRESENCE OF MR. ROSS, PURSUANT TO 
77-45-13, U.C.A. 1953. 
Appellant, in his first point, contends that it was error 
for the trial court to allow the transcript of the testimony 
of Robert S. Ross, given at preliminary hearing, to be 
received by the jury in the absence of a showing that the 
prosecution attempted to procure Mr. Ross pursuant to 
77-45-13, U.C.A. 1953. 77-45-13, U.C.A. 1953 is part of 
the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses 
from Without the State in Criminal Cases. The Act was 
adopted in Utah in 1937 and allows the State to secure the 
attendance of witnesses from outside the jurisdiction where 
the state in which the proposed witness is also located recog-
nizes by comity the request of the State of Utah. The act 
provides for the attendance of the witness in the requesting 
state but after a hearing has been held on the matter. (Uni-
form Act, Sec. 2 ) . 
In the instant case, the witness, Mr. Ross, could not be 
located in the State of Utah. An attempt was made by the 
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Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office to serve a summons upon 
the \vitness, but he was apparently not present \vithin the 
State of Utah as the subpoena could not be served and there 
\ras no record of any residence in the State of Utah. His 
last known address was listed as 309A North Street, Sausa-
lito, California. The witness was, therefore, not available to 
process from the State of Utah in the absence of the appli-
cation of the Uniform Act. 
It is well settled that the absence of a witness from the 
state is a sufficient reason for allowing the testimony of the 
\vitness previously given at preliminary hearing to be read 
to the jury. State v. Vance, 38 Utah 1, 110 Pac. 434 ( 1910). 
The appellant argues that the Uniform Act embodied in 
Chapter 45 of Title 77, U.C.A. 1953, should change that 
rule, and that an additional requirement should be met that 
the prosecution attempt to obtain the attendance of the 
\ritness pursuant to the act. 
It does not appear that this court has previously con-
sidered this matter. However, those jurisdictions that have 
have uniformly rejected the argument now advanced by the 
appellant. At the outset, it should be noted that 77-45-13 
does not make mandatory the requirement that the prose-
cution attempt to obtain a witness who is out of state. The 
act expressly states (77-45-12, 13) that the court "may" 
secure the attendance of witnesses after going through the 
procedure required by the act, including the right to a hear-
ing. The act in no way indicates that its provisions are 
mandatory in criminal cases, but rather, the act appears 
to be discretionary and permissive based upon the needs of 
the parties, the materiality of the witness's testimony and 
the hardship to the witness in providing for his return. 
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In People v. Serra, 301 Mich. 124, 3 N.W.2d 35 ( 1942), 
the Michigan Supreme Court was faced with a similar con-
tention that the Uniform Act made it mandatory that the 
prosecution attempt to obtain the presence of a material 
\vitness by the act. The question posed by the court was: 
"It is conceded that the prosecution made no attempt to procure 
the return of Briggs from New York under this statute. Was the 
failure to do so reversible error? * * *" 
The court then went on to note: 
"* * * It is not error for the court to refuse to compel the prosecu-
tion to call witnesses whose names are endorsed on the informa-
tion who are not within the State and answerable to process of the 
court. * * * " 
In considering the effect of the Uniform Act, the Michigan 
Supreme Court stated: 
"***Does the 1931 statute, supra, change the common-law rule? 
It does not in express terms impose any duty on the prosecutor to 
apply to the court for a certificate, or to make application to a 
judge of a court of record in another State for any process under 
the laws of that State. It imposes no mandate that the court of 
either State shall act- the issuance of the certificate is discre-
tionary. Seemingly, either the prosecution or the defense may 
avail itself of the procedure offered." 
*** 
"The Michigan law does not make it mandatory that the prosecu-
tion apply to the court in another State for process to compel 
return of a witness to this State. The procedure is optional with 
either the prosecution or the defense. In the case at bar, the de-
fendants had full knowledge, and equal opportunity. The show-
ing of diligence was sufficient to excuse the people from the re-
quirement to produce Briggs as a witness. The prosecutor is not 
required to resort to the procedure referred to in this statute." 
The court went on to note that the necessity of the hearing 
in the state where the witness is located and the fact that 
the act is dependent upon comity makes difficult, at best, 
the securing of a witness by the use of the Uniform Act, and 
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felt that such difficulties \vcre sufficient reasons so that the 
Legislature did not intend that the act be an obstacle to be 
complied with before the prosecution could validly dispense 
with the testimony of a material witness. 
Subsequently, in People v. Hunley, 313 Mich. 688, 21 
N.W.2d 923 ( 1946), the Michigan Supreme Court con-
sidered the identical problem now before this court. The 
testimony of a witness subsequently absent from the state 
was allowed to be received in evidence based upon a tran-
script of his testimony given at preliminary hearing. The 
court rejected the same contention made by the appellant 
in the instant case. It did so stating: 
"* * * In People v. Serra, 301 Mich. 124, 3 N.W.2d 35, we held 
that the statute was not mandatory; the prosecution need not 
apply for a certificate so as to extradite a material witness in a 
pending cause. The statute authorizing the requiring of bail by a 
material witness permits the court to demand it if he believes that 
there would be a loss of the testimony of such witness if he does 
not attend. There could not be a loss of the testimony of this wit-
ness as he had already testified. Testimony taken before a magis-
trate may be read if the witness is not present and reasonable effort 
has been made to subpoena the witness. In People v. Veiten-
heimer, 229 Mich. 409, 201 N.W. 475, we held that upon a show-
ing that the witness had enlisted in the army and was not in the 
State, his testimony taken at the examination could be read. See 
also, People v. Gibson, 253 Mich. 476, 235 N.W. 225; People v. 
Droste, 160 Mich. 66, 125 N.W. 87. Nor is the fact that defendant 
did not have an attorney at the hearing before the magistrate but 
cross-examined the witness herself sufficient reason for not using 
Carue's testimony. In People v. Myers, 239 Mich. 105, 214 N.W. 
130, we held that the testimony before an examining magistrate 
might be read at the subsequent trial even though there had been 
no previous cross-examination of the witness, it being only neces-
sary that an opportunity for cross-examination had been pres-
ent.***" 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland in Conte v. State, 
184 A.2d 823 ( Md. 1962), in a dicta pronouncement recog-
nized and approved the Michigan decisions. In doing so, 
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the court noted a holding of the Supreme Court of the State 
of Arizona in State v. ]ordanJ 83 Ariz. 248, 320 P.2d 466, in 
which that court ruled that the act was permissive and not 
mandatory. 
In People v. DayJ 219 Cal. 562,27 P.2d (Cal. 1933), the 
California Supreme Court was faced with a claim of error 
that the trial court had acted improperly in allowing the 
testimony of a witness given at preliminary hearing to be 
received over objection in the absence of an attempt by the 
prosecution to provide for the attendance of the witness by 
bail bond. The court rejected the contention that the Dis-
trict Attorney was under a mandatory duty to proceed pur-
suant to statute to secure the attendance of the material 
witness. The court stated: 
"The District Attorney was not bound to proceed under that sec-
tion." 
The court affirmed the conviction. 
In People v. LinerJ 168 Cal. App. 2d 411, 335 P.2d 964 
( 1959), an objection to the use of the testimony of a ma-
terial witness given at preliminary hearing was predicated 
upon the failure of the prosecution to attempt to secure the 
presence of the witness under the Uniform Act (Penal 
Code, Sees. 1334 to 1334.6). The court rejected the con-
tention that the trial court acted improperly in allowing 
the use of such evidence. The court stated: 
"Appellant contends that the trial court erred in permitting the 
testimony of George Katz taken at the preliminary hearing to be 
given as evidence at the trial, claiming that the prosecution should 
have been required to utilize sections 1334-1334.6 of the Penal 
Code relating to procuring the attendance of a witness outside 
the state of California. The questioned testimony was properly 
admitted under the provisions of section 686, subdivision 3, of the 
Penal Code, which provides that the deposition of a witness at the 
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preli~inary hearing may be read at the trial upon it being satis-
factonly shown that the witness can not with due diligence be 
found within the state. 
*** 
Apparently the precise question here involved has not been passed 
upon by the courts of this state. However, in People v. Cahan, 
14-l Cal. App. 2d 891,297 P.2d 715, Lee Cobert, the victim of a 
robbery, was in Las Vegas, Nevada, at the time of trial and the 
court permitted the prosecution to read in evidence his testimony 
taken at the preliminary hearing. The defendant requested a con-
tinuance for the purpose of taking Cobert's deposition under the 
Uniform Act to secure the attendance of witnesses from without 
the state in criminal cases. Pen. Code, sees. 1334-1334.6. There-
quest was denied and it was held that the court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying a continuance. 
In the instant case we find no reversible error in the action of the 
trial court in permitting the prosecution to read in evidence the 
testimony of George Katz taken at the preliminary hearing." 
In People v. Terry, 4 Cal. Rep. 597, 180 Cal. App. 2d 
48 ( 1960) , the court rejected a contention identical with 
that now urged by the appellant. It did so stating: 
"It is also contended that the attendance of the witnesses should 
have been compelled by utilizing Section 1334 et seq. of the Penal 
Code. With the consent of the reciprocating state, this statute pro-
vides a method whereby a witness can be compelled to travel to 
the jurisdiction and to testify even against his will. Appellant con-
cedes, in line with established authority, that the District Attorney 
has no obligation to resort to this statute as a condition precedent 
to the introduction of the testimony desired. People v. Liner, 168 
Cal. App. 2d 411, 415-416, 335 P.2d 964; People v. Cahan, 141 
Cal. App. 2d 891, 901, 297 P.2d 715. Also, we are not persuaded, 
as appellant has suggested, that we should overturn the weight of 
authority thus cited. What has been said with respect to the appli-
cation of Section 1334 et seq. is also true of Section 879 of the 
same code, which latter statute provides a technique whereby 
prospective witnesses can be bound where there is reason to believe 
that they may leave the jurisdiction. The cases hold that this sec-
tion is merely permissive. People v. Day, 219 Cal. 562, 565, 27 
P.2d 909; People v. Myers, 77 Cal. App. 10, 15, 245 P. 1106." 
The overwhelming weight of judicial authority appears 
to reject the position urged by the appellant. Indeed, there 
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is much merit to the position of the courts on this matter. 
First, the presence of the witness can only be obtained after 
complicated proceedings dependent, in part, upon the com-
ity of another jurisdiction. Second, where the accused has 
been afforded an opportunity to examine the witness at pre-
liminary hearing, his constitutional prerogatives have been 
preserved and, in the absence of some extremely compelling 
reason, his position would be no different were the witness 
to appear. 
This court should adopt the reasoning of the above cited 
decisions for the reasons advanced in those opinions. Addi-
tionally, since a Uniform Act is involved, uniformity of con-
struction and interpretation should be sought after. Fur-
ther, since the decisions of other states have construed an 
act similar to that of this state, sound judicial administra-
tion favors a similar result in the absence of some more 
compelling local policy. The appellant's position is with-
out merit. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING THE 
TRANSCRIPT OF THE TESTIMONY OF ROBERTS. ROSS 
TO BE READ TO THE JURY OF THE WITNESS'S PRELIMI-
NARY HEARING TESTIMONY WHERE THE TRANSCRIPT 
DID NOT RECITE THE BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION OF 
THE WITNESS. 
The appellant contends that the trial court committed 
error in allowing the preliminary hearing testimony of 
Robert S. Ross, a witness unavailable for trial, to be read to 
the jury where the testimony did not indicate or recite the 
business or profession of the witness. Appellant relies upon 
77-15-14 ( 1), which provides: 
"* * * The deposition or testimony of the witness must be authenti-
cated in the following form: 
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( 1) I~ mu~t state the name of the witness, his place of residence 
and hts bustness or profession.'' 
It should be noted that 77-15-14 does not indicate that the 
authentication is necessary before the testimony may be 
used in evidence. It merely provides that this will be a 
means of authenticating the preliminary hearing transcript 
where ( 1 ) the trial involves a homicide, or ( 2) where the 
prosecution requests a transcript of the testimony. State v. 
Sheffield, 45 Utah 426, 146 Pac. 306. Since there is nothing 
in the statute that makes the requirement that the testi-
mony state the business or profession before it may be used 
as an exception to the hearsay rule under the common law 
rules, it is submitted that there is no impediment to the use 
of such testimony at trial. As noted in McCormick, Evi-
dence ( 1954), p. 481: 
"* * * The usual approach, however, is that these statutes on 
former testimony are 'declaratory' of the common law, so far as 
they go, and not the exclusive test of admissibility. Accordingly, if 
the evidence meets the common law requirements, it will usually 
come in even though the permissive provisions of the statute do 
not mention the particular common law doctrine which the evi-
dence satisfies, * * *." 
See State v. Ham, 224 N. Car. 128, 29 S.E.2d 449 ( 1954), 
in which the North Carolina Supreme Court indicated that 
the absence of a proper certification was not an impediment 
to the use of the testimony given at a former hearing. 
77-44-3, U.C.A. 1953, expressly covers the instances 
when testimony given at a previous hearing and steno-
graphically reported, may be received in evidence in the 
absence of the witness at the time of trial. That section 
provides: 
"Whenever in any court of record the testimony of any witness in 
any criminal case shall be stenographically reported by an official 
court reporter, and thereafter such witness shall die or be beyond 
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the jurisdiction of the court in which the cause is pending, either 
party to the action may read in evidence the testimony of such 
witness, when duly certified by the reporter to be correct, in any 
subsequent trial of, or proceeding had in, the same cause, subject 
only to the same objections that might be made, if such witness 
were upon the stand and testifying in open court." 
It should be noted that the only condition to the receipt 
of the evidence is that the reporter who took the testimony 
must certify that the testimony as given is correct. There 
is no indication that the testimony contain any particular 
questions or answers. Consequently, it is submitted that 
77-44-3, U.C.A. 1953, determines the admissibility and 
use of preliminary hearing testimony and that 77-15-14 
relates only to authentication for court purposes, and is no 
inhibition to the use of the evidence at the time of trial. 
Much support for this position is to be found from 77-15-
31, U.C.A. 1953, which provides for deposition testimony 
and indicates further that the stenographer need only cer-
tify to the evidence. This court has in many instances recog-
nized the use of previous testimony given at a preliminary 
hearing where the witness is subsequently absent at the time 
of trial. 
In State v. VigilJ 123 Utah 495, 260 P.2d 539 ( 1953), 
this court noted : 
"It was proper for the court to admit into evidence the transcript 
of the preliminary hearing. The law requires that if such witness 
is beyond the jurisdiction of the court or cannot with due diligence 
be found within the state either party may read in evidence the 
testimony of such witness. 
The evidence also shows that one officer testified as to his personal 
knowledge that the Shorts had left the state. This, with the other 
facts shown, was sufficient to, and did satisfy the court that the 
Shorts were beyond the jurisdiction of the court, and thus there-
quirements of the law were satisfied." 
The court in that case relied upon 77-44-3 and 77-1-8, 
U.C.A. 1953. 
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This court has in numerous other instances allowed the 
testimony of witnesses given at preliminary hearing to be 
used at the time of trial where the witness is without the 
jurisdiction. State v. Gorham, 93 Utah 274, 72 P.2d 656 
( 1937) ; State v. DePretto, 48 Utah 249, 155 Pac. 336 
(1916); State v. Anderson, 68 Utah 551, 251 Pac. 362 
( 1926); State v. King, 24 Utah 482, 68 Pac. 418 ( 1902) ; 
State v. Vance, 38 Utah 1, 110 Pac. 434 ( 1910); State v. 
Inlow, 44 Utah 485, 141 Pac. 530 ( 1914); State v. Greene, 
38 Utah 389, 115 Pac. 181 (1910); Annotations 15 ALR 
495, 79ALR 1392; 122ALR425. 
Even if it were conceded that the authentication provi-
sions of 77-15-14 were a condition that should be complied 
with for authentication purposes, still it would appear that 
it is not a condition mandatory in the absence of which 
testimony given at a preliminary hearing could not be re-
ceived in evidence. Although appellant makes some argu-
ment that the provisions must be deemed mandatory be-
cause the word "must" is used, in People v. O'Shaughnessy, 
26 P.2d 84 7 (Cal. 1933), the California court had occasion 
to consider Section 869 of the California Penal Code, which 
is identical with Section 77-15-14, U.C.A. 1953. The ap-
pellant in that case had contended it was error to use the 
testimony at preliminary hearing in the absence of a show-
ing from the transcript as to the witness's business or profes-
sion. The California court without deciding whether or not 
the compliance with the statute was necessary in the first 
instance, ruled that the provision relating to business or pro-
fession was directory and not mandatory. The court stated: 
"The action of the court in receiving into evidence the record of the 
testimony given by Miss Johnson at ~e p~eliminary ~earin~ ~s 
assigned as error. It is first urged that th1s eVIde~ce was Inadrmssi-
ble because Miss Johnson was not asked and did not state what 
was her business or profession. Pen Code, § 869. It appears that 
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this witness was a female person, that she was living in the home 
of another woman, and the record does not show her age . If it 
may not be presumed that she had no business (see People v. Grun-
dell, 75 Cal. 301, 17 P. 214), at least it must be held that this pro-
vision is directory merely and not mandatory (People v. Grundell, 
supra; People v. Buckley, 143 Cal. 375, 77 P. 169). The appellant 
argues that had this witness stated her business, it would appear 
that she was a woman of the streets and that for this reason the 
jury would not have believed her testimony. Not only does this 
go to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility, but 
the record contains no evidence of the fact claimed, and it may 
not be assumed that the jury would have disbelieved her testi-
mony when it coincided in every detail with statements made by 
the appellant." 
Numerous other cases have ruled in a similar fashion that 
authentication requirements in preliminary hearing stat-
utes or other statutes relating to depositions are not condi-
tions precedent to the receipt of the testimony. State v. 
Maynard, 184 N. Car. 653, 113 S.E. 682 ( 1922); Serna v. 
State, 110 Tex. Crim. 220, 7 S.W.2d 543 (1928). 
A similar argument to that of the appellant was urged in 
State v. Maslick, 59 Utah 75, 202 Pac. 6 ( 1921), where 
there was a failure to file the transcript notes with the court, 
as required by statute. In rejecting a contention that the 
use of the preliminary hearing testimony was precluded, 
the court stated: 
"* * *The transcript being concededly true and correct, appellant 
could not possibly sustain prejudice or injury from the absence of 
the stenographic notes. * * *" 
See 79 ALR 1420. 
Finally, since this court must weigh for specific error 
77--42-1, U.C.A. 1953, even if the appellant's position were 
correct, it must be determined whether the failure to desig-
nate the business or profession of the witness Ross could be 
deemed prejudicial to the appellant at trial. Obviously it 
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could not. The importance of Ross' testimony was not his 
connection \\'ith the appellant, but whether or not his abil-
ity to identify the appellant as the culprit was in anyway 
diminished. His business or profession would in most in-
stances be irrelevant to this question. It can hardly be said 
that there \vas any prejudice from the failure to meet the 
authentication requirement. 
Finally, as noted above in McCormick, infra, p. 9, most 
statutes are not demed to supplant the common law rule, 
but are felt to supplement it and are declaratory only. Con-
sequently, since in the instant case the parties and issues 
were the same as at the time of preliminary hearing, the 
testimony is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. 
Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd Edition, Sec. 1370, 1371; McCor-
mick, Evidence, Ch. 26, p. 480 ( 1954). 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant's position, when analyzed against the 
cases from other jurisdictions which have concerned them-
selves \Vith the arguments now before this court, is of little 
merit. An analysis of judicial precedents and the logic and 
statutory requirements attendant to the use of former testi-
mony can only lead to the conclusion that there was no in-
justice done to the appellant in the instant case. 
This court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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